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ABSTRACT. Past vends in fertility and mortality in China have led to an age eomposi- 
tion that will age rapidly in the coming decades. In this paper we examine measures of 
population aging in China from 1953 to 1982, and then project population aging to the 
year 2050 using a cohort-components methodology. The projected measures of popula- 
tion aging that result fxom these forecasts are then decomposed into the relative 
contributions that are made to these changes by past, present, and future trends in fertility 
and mortality. Results indicate that China's population will age at an unprecedented rate 
over the next 70 years, both in terms of the absolute size of the elderly population and 
their proportion of the total population. At least 50 percent of the projected increase in 
population aging in China between1980 and 2050 will be a product of the momentum for 
aging that is already built into the present age structure and vital rates. However, 
prospective trends in the measures of population aging become increasingly more 
sensitive to varying assumptions about fertility and mortality with time, and as older age 
groups are considered. This analysis provides the demographic basis for evaluating the 
possible effects of population aging on health care, social security, and other social and 
economic issues. 
INTRODUCTION 
After  the cultural revolution in the late 1970s Chinese pol icy-makers  and 
scientists expressed a renewed concern over  the size and growth rate of  the 
nat ion 's  population. At  that t ime Chinese scientists recognized that population- 
related problems needed to be addressed with urgency, and in response the 
Chinese government  quickly set into motion policies that would produce rapid  
declines in growth rates and eventually lead the nation to an "opt imum" 
population size (Ming 1979; Chen 1979a). a With  the understanding that the 
momentum for population growth would be extremely difficult to manage,  and 
given l imited resources and a general lack of  concern and knowledge about 
other possible  demographic consequences of  their actions, Chinese officials 
decided to focus their attention exclusively on reducing the popula t ion ' s  birth 
rate. The result was China ' s  now well-known one-child family policy.  
China ' s  one-child pol icy  was implemented in 1979 in an effort to meet  the 
target of  an opt imum population of  1.2 bill ion set for the year  2000 (Chert 
1979a; Guanming Daily 1979). In addition to this opt imum population size, the 
government  expected to achieve zero population growth by the year  2000 and a 
targeted growth rate for the 1980s ranging from 0.5% to 1.0% depending on 
who was setting the targets. 2 These targets were later supported by  population 
forecasts made by Chinese scientists which illustrated how varying trends in 
fertility would lead to a wide range of  optimum population levels, and that a 
target total fe~il i ty rate (TFR) of  1.5 would eventually lead to a stabilized 
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population of 1.2 billion people (Song et al. 1980). In effect, these forecasts 
represented the ex post facto justification for the strict one-child policy that was 
introduced two years earlier. 
While the one-child policy was advertised as a series of positive sanctions that 
would 'encourage' couples to delay marriage and childbearing and have only 
one child, 3 it has been noted by Banister (1986) and revealed in the Chinese 
literature (NFRB 1983; KMJP 1979), that more extreme family planning 
measures have been used in some provinces (e.g. required sterilization of either 
the husband or the wife for couples who already have two children, the required 
insertion of IUDs in women with one child, and abortions for women who 
became pregnant without official permission). The implementation of the one- 
child policy illustrates the tenacity with which the Chinese government is 
capable of altering the nation's demographic processes. In any event, primarily 
as a result of this and other family planning policies, the total fertility rate (TFR) 
declined from a level of 6.0 in 1960 to about 2.1 today (Bongaarts and Green- 
halgh 1985). Numerous articles have appeared in the Chinese and western 
demographic literature which have evaluated both the effectiveness of this 
policy in reducing the rate of population growth, and the social and economic 
implications of subsequent perturbations in China's age composition (Aird 
1986; Banister 1987, 1988; Bongaarts and Greenhalgh 1985; Coale 1981; 
Keyfitz 1984; Liang et al. 1986; Wei 1987; Wu 1986; Wu and Xu 1987). 
When the one-child policy was ftrst inlroduced, several Chinese scientists 
noted that if such a program were successful it would lead to a rapid narrowing 
of the base of the age structure, and an acceleration of population aging to the 
point where an estimated 20-30% of China's total population would be aged 60 
and over within 50 years of the implementation of the policy (Hu et al. 1980). In 
spite of these early warnings, both government officials and some scientists 
(who were actually responsible for making these forecasts) insisted at the time 
that either there was no need to worry about the problem until after the year 
2020 (Chen 1979b; FBIS 1980), 4 or that population aging could be avoided by 
increasing fertility in the future (Hu et al. 1980; Tian 1980). Some Chinese 
scientists have even argued more recently that the size of the elderly population 
will remain constant for the next 45 years (China Population Newsletter 1986), 
or that the best insurance against population aging in the distant future is a 
successful family planning program today (Hao and Wang 1987; RKYJ 1987). 
Others have noted that because the percentage of the population aged 65 and 
over in China will not exceed the international definition of an aged population 
(e.g. where 7% of the total population is aged 65 and over) until early into the 
next century, then population aging need not be considered a problem at this 
time (China Population Newsletter 1986; FBIS 1980). Even today there are still 
some Chinese scientists and political officials who ignore the basic demographic 
principles associated with shifts in age composition, and fail to recognize the 
policy implications of the impending explosive growth of the absolute size of 
their elderly population. 
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In spite of these efforts to dismiss the issue of population aging, within 5 
years of the implementation of the one-child policy several well-known Chinese 
demographers presented forecasts which illustrated that if low fertility rates 
persisted past the middle of the next century, the population aged 65 and over 
would inevitably comprise from 36--41 percent of the total population sometime 
between 2045 and 2080 (Gui 1983). Other well-known Chinese demographers 
and political officials quickly echoed these concerns about population aging and 
recognized that the problem was serious enough to warrant either the develop- 
ment of new policies to deal with population aging, or a change in the one-child 
policy (Wu 1985; Wu 1984a; Wu 1984b; Tao 1984; Qie 1984; Tian 1984). New 
population projections then illustrated how the government could achieve an 
optimum population of under one billion people and at the same time slow the 
rate of population aging (Tian 1984). By eventually relaxing the stringent goals 
of the one-child policy fertility could gradually rise back to replacement levels, 
and population aging would begin to decelerate. 5 In short, there is now a major 
research effort underway in China to understand the social and economic 
problems associated with population aging, and to develop policies that will 
reduce its major impacts. 
POPULATION AGING IN CHINA: 
MAGNITUDE, MOMENTUM, MORBIDITY 
There are several reasons that the problems associated with population aging in 
China require prompt attention. The most apparent issue is the sheer magnitude 
of the problem or the absolute number of people involved. Even though China 
has a comparatively small percentage (5.5%) of its total population currently 
over the age of 65, this translates into about 59.8 million people, most of whom 
live in rural areas (Kinsella 1988). By comparison, in the United States there 
were 29.2 million persons aged 65 and over in 1986 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 
1988, 13). Regardless of how fertility rates change during the next six decades, 
it has been estimated that the population aged 65 and over in China would still 
increase in absolute numbers to between 267.8 to 340.9 million persons by the 
year 2050, which would be about 20-22 percent of the total population (Banister 
1987, 1988; Wu and Xu 1987). Consequently by the year 2050, the number of 
people aged 65 and older in China will certainly exceed the total number of 
people of all ages in the United States today. Since the number of people who 
will be over the age of 65 between 1985 and the year 2050 have already been 
born, these differences in projections of the size of the elderly population occur 
solely as a result of different assumptions about mortality. 6 
Figure 1 compares the observed size of the 65 and older population in China 
and the United States during selected time periods in the past, and projections of 
the elderly population for these countries made by different authors. While 
China's total population size was 3.65 times greater than that of the U.S. in 
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elderly population in the U.S. because fertility and mortality rates prior to 1953 
produced a much younger age composition for China. Even though the elderly 
population of the U.S. is projected to exceed 67 million persons by the year 
2050, in China the size of the elderly population is projected to be more than 
four times greater, with at least 267 million persons over age 65. The projected 
range of the size of the 65 and older population of China for the year 2050 is 
267.8 million (Grigsby and Olshansky in this paper) to 340.9 million by 
Bannister (1988) - virtually all of which is attributable to variation in assump- 
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Figure 2. 
In spite of the fact that the size of the elderly population of China nearly 
doubled from 1964 to 1982, the overall shape of the age compositions for the 
two time periods were remarkably similar (see Figure 2). The growth rate of the 
population in most age groups remained fairly constant during these years, 
thereby producing an expansion of the age pyramid while leaving constant the 
age-sex dislribution of the population. However, from 1964 to 1982 the oldest 
age groups did experience a small proportional increase while the percentage 
distribution of the two youngest age groups did decline substantially. The 
population distribution of the U.S. in 1982 is presented here to illustrate 
differences in magnitude of the size of the various age groups. 
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similarity in age compositions by comparing the 
percentage distribution of China's population by age and sex during these same 
years. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate that it is possible to experience population aging 
in terms of increases in the absolute size of the elderly population during a time 
in which the overall age distribution of the population does not change. If 
population aging were measured using only the percentage of the total popula- 
tion aged 65 and older, then one would conclude that China's population had not 
aged significantly from 1964 to 1982. This was indeed the conclusion that was 
drawn by some Chinese policymakers and scientists (China Population Newslet- 
ter 1986; FBIS 1980). 8 It is for this reason that more attention should be given to 
evaluating several different kinds of measures of population aging rather than 
focusing exclusively on the percentage of the total population that is elderly. 
A second issue is the m o m e n t u m  for population aging that is already built 
into China's age structure, and the presence of a number of social, economic, 
and demographic factors that are likely to accelerate population aging beyond 
current projections. Past levels of fertility and mortality have led to an age 
composition today which is primed for rapid increases in all of the measures of 
population aging and an unprecedented increase in the absolute numbers of 
people over the age of 65 (See Figure 1). This aging process is inevitable as the 
extremely large birth cohorts of the period 1960 to 1970 begin to pass through 
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the middle and older ages during the next 70 years. Population aging in China 
will also be accelerated by the rapid narrowing of the base of the age structure 
that is caused by the successful one-child family policy. This will bring rapid 
increases in measures of population aging which quantify shifts in age composi- 
tion, as the narrowing of the base of the age pyramid will cause an increase in 
the relative proportion of the total population that is old. Finally, if in the next 
60 years mortality rates begin to decline even marginally beyond current 
expectations for cohorts surviving to older age groups, then this will place a 
third and rather substantial upward pressure on the momentum for population 
aging in China. Under these conditions, both the absolute number of elderly 
persons and their percentage of the total population would increase as the apex 
of the age pyramid would be expanded. 
In addition to problems of magnitude and momentum for population aging, 
China also faces the difficult task of financially supporting and meeting the 
acute and chronic morbidity requirements of a rapidly expanding elderly 
population, particularly with respect to the provision of long-term care. While 
life expectancy at birth in China resembles that of a developed country (70 
years), the quality and delivery of health care are still more like that of a 
developing country. For example, while the total number of hospitals and health 
care workers increased since 1970, the majority of this increase took place in 
urban areas where less than one-fourth of the population live (Banister 1986). 
Many of the barefoot doctors who used to provide minimal health care in rural 
areas, have abandoned their medical work in favor of more financially reward- 
ing jobs in agriculture (Banister 1986, 13). There is no health insurance 
coverage for those in rural areas who are not members of a cooperative medical 
plan, and the cooperative medical system that is in place has deteriorated in 
recent years (Banister 1986, 16). Finally, for years the Chinese government has 
been absorbing an increasing share of the money spent on health care, and this is 
expected to continue well into the future. 
The rapid aging of China's population will add considerably to the strain on 
the nation's health care system. Either more funds will need to be provided by 
the government to handle the health care requirements of the elderly, or existing 
funds used for other purposes such as family planning, will need to be re- 
directed toward health care for the aged. Additionally, acute and long-term 
health care facilities like those in developed countries that are designed to 
handle the unique and costly health care requirements of the elderly, are 
practically non-existent in China. In the absence of these kinds of facilities, and 
given the magnitude of the growth of the elderly population that is expected by 
the middle of the next century, it is anticipated that China will have a difficult 
time maintaining their relatively high health standards (Hsiao 1988). 
Finally, it should be emphasized that China relies heavily on the family as an 
institution for providing both financial and social support for the elderly. A 
successful one-child policy will inevitably bring an increase in the number of 
childless elderly couples who will need state-funded financial support. 9 It will 
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also create an unfair burden on the children born during this era because many 
will face the unenviable responsibility of caring for four elderly parents, 1-2 of 
their own children, and any grandparents that may survive to much older ages 
(Wu and Xu 1987). Additionally, the pension system in China meets the 
requirements of only a relatively small portion of the nation's elderly (Banister 
1988, 5--6). There is increasing concern that the economy will not be able to 
support either the increases in expenditures for the growing population who will 
receive benefits under the existing pension scheme (e.g., social security, medical 
care, housing, lransportation, etc.), nor is it likely that such a pension scheme 
could be expanded to provide even basic expenses for the remainder of the 
elderly population (Banister 1988; Wu 1984a; Zhao and Jiang 1986). 
MEASURING POPULATION AGING IN CHINA: 1953-1982 
The process of population aging refers generally to a shift in age composition in 
the" direction of older ages. It typically occurs among nations that have ex- 
perienced rapid population growth during the transition from high to low levels 
of fertility and mortality, and it is accelerated by declining mortality for older 
age groups. While there is no single demographic measure that qualifies as the 
best measure of population aging, certainly it has been common to examine 
trends in the relative proportions of the population that are defined as elderly. It 
is also reasonable to consider a number of other measures of populaton aging 
which provide additional insights into the various ways in which a population 
ages. In this section we follow trends in several measures of population aging in 
China from 1953 to 1982, and discuss briefly the relative merits of these 
measures as they apply specifically to China. 
One of the most common measures of population aging is the proportion of 
the total population that is old. The age which delimits "old" is often culture- 
bound, although it often refers to the age of eligibility for a social or economic 
benefit, or an age when a large segment of the populaton has a significant 
physical, economic, or social need. The age of 65 is used most often by nations 
of both the developed and developing world to define the "old" or elderly 
population. In China, however, the age of 60 has been used to define the elderly 
population as urban employees tend to retire at that age (Wu and Xu 1987). 
More recent publications regarding population aging in China have tended to 
use the age of 65 as the lower bound of the older population (e.g. Song et al., 
1985; Banister 1987). 
The data in Table I illustrate that regardless of which age is used to define old, 
it is clear that the relative proportions of all of the age groups over the age of 55 
in China decreased from 1953 to 1964, and then increased from 1964 to 1982 to 
signify that population aging had begun. The age of 55 was included in this table 
because this is the age at retirement for women working in some urban occupa- 
tions. This trend toward a younger population followed by an aging population 
occurred primarily because of high birth rates and rapidly declining infant and 
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child mortality rates in the 1950s, both of which caused an expansion at the base 
of the age pyramid. Lower birth rates beginning in the early 1970s began to 
narrow the base of the age structure and increase the relative proportion of the 
population that was old. 
TABLE I 
Measures of Population Aging in China 
(1953, 1964, 1982) 
Measures of 1953 1964 1982 
Population Aging (1) (2) (3) 
Percent of the 
Population Aged 
55+ 10.88 9.40 11.02 
60+ 7.26 6.13 7.64 
65+ 4.38 3.56 4.91 
70+ 2.32 1.88 2.79 
75+ 0.95 0.81 1.36 
80+ 0.32 0.26 0.50 
P(75+)/P(65+) 21.75 22.66 27.72 
P(80+)/P(65+) 7.40 7.38 10.25 
0--14 35.92 40.69 33.60 
15-64 59.71 55.74 61.49 
P(65+)/P(0-14) 12.19 8.76 14.61 
Median Age 23.02 20.20 22.65 
Dependency Ratio 67.49 79.40 62.62 
Index of Relative 
Difference - 6.21 8.90 
Index of Dissimilarity - 5.86 9.61 
Source: These measures were calculated from data published in Banister (1987, pp. 25, 
27, 34). 
Another measure of population aging is the relative age distribution of the 
elderly population itself. The measures used most often to quantify the aging of 
the aged is to take the ratio of the number of people aged 75+, 80+, or 85+ by 
the population aged 65 and over. Increases in these measures indicate that the 
relative distribution of the elderly population itself is aging. In China it is 
apparent that while the elderly population did not age much from 1953 to 1964, 
by 1982 the "old-old" comprised almost 28 percent of the older population 
itself, an increase of  over 5 percent from 1964. The proportion of the older 
population over age 80 also increased during this time period. 
The proportion of persons in younger age groups, for example under age 15 or 
between ages 15 and 64, also measure population age structure even though they 
do not take the elderly into account directly. Often the reason for studying the 
numbers or proportions of persons in these age groups is to answer policy 
questions, such as planning for school enrollments or for estimating the size of 
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the labor force. Between 1953 and 1964, the proportion of the population under 
age 14 increased from 36 percent to 41 percent, but declined to 34 percent by 
1982. The "working age" population aged 15-64 comprised approximately 60 
percent of the total population in both 1953 and 1982, and was somewhat lower 
in 1964. 
Several other kinds of ratio measures have also been constructed to measure 
population age structure. The most familiar to demographers is the standard 
dependency ratio, with the young (ages 0-14) and old (ages 65 and older) 
populations in the numerator and the "working age" (15--64) population in the 
denominator. The numerator is supposed to approximate the economically 
dependent population while the denominator represents the economically active 
population. However, since age is not a perfect indicator of economic activity, 
the dependency ratio does not measure dependency very accurately and it tends 
to perpetuate the negative stereotype of persons over age 65 as being dependent 
on persons aged 15 to 64. Furthermore, the dependency ratio does not provide 
an accurate picture of the population age structure because the numerator 
contains both the young and old populations. Typically, increases in the 
proportion of older persons occur along with decreases in the proportion of 
young persons. These two effects tend to balance each other so that populations 
with very different age structures may have similar dependency ratios. Neverthe- 
less, for policy purposes it may be useful to examine the dependency ratio, not 
necessarily as an indicator of population aging, but rather to see how it is 
affected by population aging. Between 1953 and 1964, the dependency ratio 
increased due to the rise in the proportion of younger persons and a decline in 
the proportion of working-age persons. By 1982 the dependency ratio had 
decreased even below its former level in 1953, as the proportion of younger 
persons declined while the working-age population increased in proportion. 
Shryock and Siegel (1980, p. 234) suggested that the aged-to-youth ratio may 
be the best measure of population aging because this measure includes the two 
population subgroups which change the most during the demographic transition 
(e.g. the population aged 0-15 and 65+). Indeed, the aged-to-youth ratio 
declined in China between 1953 and 1964, as the population grew slightly 
younger, and it rose again between 1964 and 1982. 
The average age of the population (either the median age or mean age) has 
intuitive appeal for summarizing the age structure. While the average age rarely, 
if ever, guides public policy (for instance, in determining an age of eligibility for 
entitlement programs), it is convenient for comparing the age structures of two 
or more populations. The average age also allows the researcher to measure 
population aging without having to define what age is old. The median age of 
the Chinese population decreased from 23 years in 1953 to 20 years in 1964, 
then rose to 23 years again by 1982. 
In addition to measuring population aging per se, it is also possible to measure 
differences in the age structure of a population across time and summarize them 
in a single index. The index of dissimilarity measures the proportion of a 
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population in one time period that would have to "move" into other age groups 
in order to resemble the age structure of the same population during another 
time period. The index of relative difference summarizes the percentage 
difference within each age group across time. Both indexes depend on the 
number of age groups as well as the differences in the age structure. When 
comparing more than two populations, therefore, it is useful to have a single 
reference population (Shryock and Siegel 1980, pp. 232-233). The reference or 
standard population used in this case was the 1953 population of China. Since 
both of these indexes increased from 1964 to 1982, this indicates that the change 
in the age structure of the Chinese population was greater between 1964 and 
1982 then it was between 1953 and 1964. 
In summary, virtually aU of the measures of population aging presented in 
Table I demonstrate that the population of China grew younger between 1953 
and 1964, and aged from 1964 to 1982. The data in Figure 3 indicate that the 
absolute size of the elderly population in China also increased substantially 
during this latter time period - further substantiating that the population aged. It 
should be noted that at least in China the changes in age composition that took 
place during this time of population aging actually led to a decrease in the 
dependency ratio - another example of how the dependency ratio does not 
always reflect population aging. In the next section we will examine the effects 
on measures of population aging, of a range of projection assumptions regarding 
the components of population change in China. 
PROJECTING POPULATION AGING IN CHINA: 1980-2050 
Population projections that have been made for China by various sources have 
often been made by using two or three fertility assumptions and only one 
mortality assumption to illustrate a range of outcomes (Banister 1986; 1987; 
Bongaarts and Greenhalgh 1985; Wu and Xu 1987). In China, just as in most 
other nations, future trends in mortality are just as uncertain as those of fertility. 
In fact, China already has a mortality schedule and a life expectancy at birth (of 
70 years) that compares to that of many developed nations. The transition to this 
favorable mortality schedule occurred over a very short time period from 1949 
to 1975 for reasons that are not entirely clear (Banister and Preston, 1981), and 
there is still the presence of relatively high mortality rates for younger age 
groups - indicating that there is considerable room for additional improvements 
in mortality. While Banister (1986) has argued that further improvements in 
mortality may occur more slowly in the future because of inadequate health care 
in rural areas and increased cigarette smoking, it is still possible that significant 
mortality declines may occur in the near future. Moreover, it has already been 
demonstrated that future trends in population aging in China will be very 
sensitive to minor variations in assumptions about mortality (Xu 1985). It is for 
these reasons that we have included high, medium, and low estimates of future 
trends in mortality in our population projections. 
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Future trends in fertility are also subject to speculation. In this study we used 
the low, medium, and high assumptions about fertility in China that were made 
by the United Nations (1986) from 1980 to the year 2025, and then projected 
that each series would increase to a total fertility rate of 2.11 children per 
woman by 2050. Migration was assumed to be zero. 1° Details of both the 
fertility and mortality assumptions used in this study are provided in Table A-I 
in the appendix. 
The combination of low fertility and low mortality is known to produce the 
greatest amount of population aging, wtiile the high series of fertility and 
mortality will produce the least amount of population aging. All other combina- 
tions of fertility and mortality schedules result in age structures between these 
two extremes. The medium fertility and medium mortality assumptions were 
used to project a population age structure that is intermediate to these. The 1980 
population of China (United Nations 1982) was projected forward in time using 
a cohort-components methodology (The Futures Group 1987). The projections 
presented here are similar to those of Aird (1986), Banister (1987) and Wu and 
Xu (1987) in terms of both the total projected population size and the projected 
shape of the age structures, taking into account the minor variation in assump- 
tions. 
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Figure 4 shows the population pyramids for the medium projection series for 
the years 1980, 2000 and 2050. This figure illustrates how the relatively large 
birth cohorts of the 1960s and early 1970s will continue to produce bulges in 
China's future age composition. This will occur not only as these cohorts age, 
but also as they pass through their reproductive years and produce an echo effect 
of the baby boom period in which they were born, There is now an effort 
underway in China to smooth out these subsequent baby boom echoes or birth 
peaks (Wu 1984b, 1985; Zhao 1979). It is also apparent that like most developed 
nations, the shape of the age pyramid in China will become much more rectan- 
gular as the population ages. Note that the largest difference in the age structures 
is at the apex where the old-old (80+) population will grow faster than any other 
age group. 
The medium-range projections of the population aged 0-14, 15-64, and 65 
and over from 1980 to 2050 are located in Table A-II in the appendix. Accord- 
ing to this table, the size of the population aged 0-14 will decline slightly 
between 1980 and 1990, and then remain fairly constant to the year 2050. The 
population aged 15-64 will increase steadily to about the year 2020, and then 
level off. The 65 and older population is projected to increase throughout the 
projection time period where it is expected to account for about 18 percent of the 
total population by the year 2050. These data indicate clearly that the projected 
changes in the actual size and distribution of the elderly population in China will 
be dramatic in the coming decades. 
TABLE// 
Projected percentage of the Chinese population 
at ages 0-14, 15-64, and 65+, 
low, medium and high assumptions (1990-2050) 
Percentage of the Population Aged 
65+ 0-14 15--64 
YEAR Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
1990 6.42 6.35 6.17 25.44 26.22 28.28 68.14 67 .43  65.55 
1995 6.96 6.81 6.55 23.30 24.92 27.76 69 .75  68.27 65.69 
2000 7.58 7.29 6.97 21.16 23.94 26.06 71.27 68.77 66.97 
2005 8.27 7.82 7.41 19 .49  22 .73  24.28 72.24 69.45 68.31 
2010 8.98 8.32 7.77 18.13 21.62 23.02 72.90 70.06 69.21 
2015 10.26 9.29 8.54 17.10 20.46 22.18 72.64 70.25 69.28 
2020 12.67 11 .19  1 0 . 1 3  16 .30  19 .92  21.68 71.03 68.89 68.19 
2025 15.32 13 .16  1 1 . 7 5  15 .80  19.86 21.28 68.88 66 .98  66.97 
2030 17.82 14 .88  1 3 . 1 2  15.65 19.89 2 0 . 8 1  66 .53  65.23 66.07 
2035 20.53 16 .69  1 4 . 5 5  15 .66  19.71 20.40 63.81 63.60 65.06 
2040 23.06 18 .26  1 5 . 6 8  15 .92  19.41 20.16 61.02 62.33 64.15 
2045 23.66 18.18 1 5 . 3 5  16 .33  19.31 20.14 60.01 62.50 64.51 
2050 23 .91  17 .90  1 5 . 6 4  16.91 19 .48  20.19 59.18 62.62 64.17 
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Table II records the projected percentage distribution of the population in 
these age ranges using all three assumptions. The percentage of the total 
population aged 0-14 is projected to decline rapidly past the year 1980 because 
of the one-child policy, and then decline slightly to the year 2050. The popula- 
tion aged 15--64 is projected to increase as a percentage of the total population 
until the year 2015, and then decline to a low of 62.3 percent in the year 2040. 
The 65 and older population is expected to increase as a proportion of the total 
population to between 15.6 to 23.9 percent by the year 2050. These data indicate 
that regardless of which assumptions about fertility and mortality are used, the 
elderly population is expected to at least double, and more than likely triple as a 
proportion of the total population by the middle of the next century. 
TABLE IR 
Projected growth rates of the population aged 65+ and 80+ 
in China from 1980 to 2050 (medium assumption) 
Growth Rate (65+) Growth Rate (80+) 
From 1980 Five-Year Annual From 1980 Five-Year Annual 
YEAR (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1985 13.81 13.81 2.59 27.55 27.55 4.87 
1990 29.00 13.35 2.51 53.36 20.24 3.69 
1995 45.85 13.06 2.46 79.94 19.33 3.20 
2000 64.20 12.59 2.37 110.78 17.14 3.16 
2005 83.65 11.84 2.24 144.30 15.90 2.95 
2010 102.24 10.12 1.93 179.78 14.52 2.71 
2015 132.57 15.00 2.79 217.88 13.62 2.55 
2020 187.68 23.69 4.25 259.78 13.18 2.48 
2025 246.31 20.38 3.71 297.65 10.52 2.00 
2030 298.29 15.01 2.80 378.30 20.28 3.69 
2035 350.81 13.19 2.48 531.48 32.03 5.56 
2040 394.57 9.71 1.85 656.13 19.74 3.60 
2045 392.43 -0.43 -0.09 743.56 11.56 2.19 
2050 383.94 -1.73 -0.35 845.85 12.13 2.29 
Another way of illustrating the growth of the elderly population is to examine 
the projected growth rates of the population in selected age ranges. Table III 
shows the growth rotes of the Chinese population aged 65+ and 80+ from 1980 
to the year 2050 in five-year intervals using the medium-range assumptions. The 
numbers listed in columns 1 and 4 show the projected cumulative growth rates 
of the population in these age groups from 1980. For example, the population 
aged 65+ is projected to grow by 13.81 percent from 1980 to 1985, and by 246 
percent by 2025. The numbers listed in columns 2 and 5 show the projected 
five-year growth rates of the population within each five-year period. The figure 
of 12.13 in column 5 for the year 2050 means that the population aged 80+ is 
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projected to increase by 12.13 percent from 2045 to 2050. The numbers listed in 
column 3 and 6 show the projected annual growth rates of the population within 
each 5-year time interval. The figure of 4.25 in column 3 for the year 2020 
means that the population aged 65+ is projected to increase by 4.25 percent 
annually from 1980 to 1985. These data illustrate that the population aged 65 
and over will reach its peak growth rate from the observed 1980 population in 
the year 2040, after which slight declines are expected. The most rapid annual 
and 5-year growth rates for this age group will occur between the years 2020 
and 2030. Even more striking is the projected growth rate of over 845 percent 
for the population aged 80+ from 1980 to the year 2050. The largest annual and 
5-year growth rates will occur between 2030 and 2045 for this age group. The 
timing of these peak growth rate years are directly related to the aging of the 
large birth cohorts born during the period from 1960 to 1970. It is apparent from 
these data that not only will the Chinese population age, but the size of the 
elderly population (particularly the oldest old) will grow at an extremely rapid 
pace before the year 2050. 
The measures of population aging are also projected to increase rapidly in 
China over the next 70 years, and some of these measures are quite sensitive to 
the various assumptions used. Table IV lists both observed and projected 
measures of population aging using all three projection assumptions for the 
years 2000, 2025, and 2050. Note that for the year 2000, most of the measures 
listed here are not sensitive to the various projection assumptions with the 
exception of those measures which include the population aged 0-14. This 
occurs because these measures are heavily dependent on differences in asstimp- 
tions about fertility, and these did vary considerably to the year 2000 (see Table 
A-I). 
By the year 2025 all of the other measures listed here, with the exception of 
those which evaluate the aging of the elderly, become sensitive to the various 
assumptions, not only because of earlier differences in assumptions about 
fertility, but also because the different mortality assumptions begin to alter 
significantly the projected size of the elderly population. By the year 2050 
virtually all of the measures of population aging show variation with the 
alternative fertility and mortality assumptions. 
These prospective trends in population aging in China have been noted in 
numerous other publications. While there are differences in the assumptions 
about how fertility and mortality might change in the future, the consensus is 
that population aging will occur in China at an accelerated pace by comparison 
to other nations of the developed and developing world. Minor variations in 
assumptions about fertility will tend to alter projections of the proportional 
distribution of the elderly population while minor variations in assumptions 
about mortality will influence the size of the elderly population. What has yet to 
be revealed by other researchers in their projections about population aging in 
China (or any other country) is the relative contribution of the various com- 
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the aging process into its relative components is that it then becomes possible to 
determine 1) just how much momentum for aging is built into the age structure 
and present vital rates and thus how much of the aging process is inevitable, and 
2) precisely what kinds of demographic policies might be implemented to alter 
vital rates so as to minimize the problems of population aging. In the following 
section the projected measures of population aging are decomposed into the 
relative contributions of each of the components which will influence its course. 
DECOMPOSING MEASURES OF POPULATION AGING IN CHINA 
The age structure of a closed population like China can change as fertility and 
mortality change. Typically, mortality transitions do not occur uniformly at all 
ages, as they initially tend to favor the youngest age groups as a result of a 
reduced risk of infectious and parasitic diseases, and later they affect the middle 
and older age groups as the risk of degenerative diseases tend to subside. The 
mortality declines in China from 1953 to 1964 favored the youngest age groups, 
making the population younger as the base of the age pyramid expanded rapidly. 
Projected declines in mortality beyond 1985 are expected to favor the middle 
and older age groups, and will contribute to population aging by expanding the 
middle and apex of the age pyramid. 
As fertility rates decline from high to low levels, a population ages rapidly (as 
measured by lbroportional changes in age composition) because the relative size 
of the youngest (and largest) age groups decline rapidly. Conversely, increases 
in fertility will make a population younger. 
Even in the absence of changes in fertility and mortality, a population can age 
as a result of the momentum that is inherent in its initial age structure and initial 
vital rates. This momentum is analogous to the momentum for population 
growth that may persist in a population with a young age structure even after 
fertility has reached replacement levels. For example, the fertility and mortality 
rates that are present in a population at any moment in time are likely to differ 
significantly from those that prevailed during the previous 80 years which 
created the age structure at that moment. This is the case with China. The 
relatively large cohorts bern during the 1960s and early 1970s will shape the age 
structure of China's population in the future, just as the baby boom cohort of 
1946-1964 will continue to affect the U.S. population age structure well into the 
next century. This concept of momentum for population aging is what led 
several Chinese scientists to conclude that population aging would not be a 
problem in China because there was nothing that could be done to alter the 
course of past demographic events (Hao and Wang 1987; Hu et al. 1980; Ma 
1987). What these scientists failed to appreciate was that four demographic 
factors regulate the rate at which a population ages from any moment in time: 
the age structure at any given time - referred to here as time zero (e.g. the 
cumulative effects of past levels of fertility and mortality), the vital rates at time 
zero, and prospective changes in fertility and mortality. Projected changes in the 
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measures of population aging may therefore be decomposed into the relative 
contributions that are made by each of these components. A method for 
performing such a decomposition has been developed by Grigsby (1988). 
The decomposition method developed by Grigsby (1988) is similar to a 
method used by Yu and Horiuchi (1987), with one notable difference. Both 
methods develop a series of four projection scenarios which represent the four 
different combinations of either altering, or holding constant, assumptions about 
fertility and mortality. These include fertility constant and mortality constant 
(FCMC); fertility constant and mortality varying (FCMV); fertility varying and 
mortality constant (FVMC); and fertility varying and mortality varying 
(FVMV). By considering differences in population growth that occur in 
different age groups under these various scenarios, it is possible to determine the 
precise contribution of each component to projected changes on the measures of 
population aging. 
The first projection scenario (FCMC) assumes that the vital rates observed at 
time zero for each calendar year continue to the end of the projection period. In 
this case time zero is the year 1980 in China (United Nations 1986), and the 
projection time frame is 70 years (to the year 2050). The fourth projection 
scenario (FVMV) refers to a series or range of assumptions about how fertility 
and mortality rates will change over the projection time frame. The second and 
third projection scenarios vary either fertility or mortality while holding the 
other constant. 
The effect of the initial conditions (e.g., fertility and mortality conditions that 
prevail at time zero) on prospective trends in measures of population aging is 
determined by comparing the difference between the age structure at time zero 
and the age structure projected under the FCMC scenario. It is at this point that 
the Grigsby (1988) and Yu and Horiuchi (1987) methods differ. Yu and 
Horiuchi (1987) labeled this difference as the effect of the initial age structure, 
and defined it only as the fertility and mortality schedules that prevailed at time 
zero. By attributing subsequent changes in population aging solely to the fertility 
and mortality schedules at time zero, the effects of past trends in fertility and 
mortality which created the age structure at that time are ignored (Coale 1987). 
Such a definition would be appropriate only if the fertility and mortality 
conditions at time zero are the same as those which produced the age pyramid 
for that year. In China, as with all other nations, the fertility and mortality 
conditions of the past 80 years are far different from those which prevail today. 
Continuing the 1980 vital rates would produce a different age structure, one that 
in the short-run would depend on both the current age structure and vital rates, 
but in the long-run would depend only on the fertility and mortality schedules at 
time zero (Coale 1964; Horiuchi and Preston 1988). The method developed by 
Grigsby (1988) separates the effects of both age composition and vital rates at 
time zero on measures of population aging. 
The effect of prospective changes in fertility rates on measures of population 
aging is assessed by comparing the FCMV projection with the FCMC projection 
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scenario, and the FVMV projection with the FCMV scenario. This second 
component may be thought of as the interaction of changing fertility and 
mortality. With this methodology the effect of changing fertility on measures of 
population aging is computed as the average of these two components (see Yu 
and Horiuchi 1987). The effect of changing mortality on measures of population 
aging is computed analogously. The main advantage of defining the components 
of demographic change in this manner is that they sum exactly to the total 
change in the measure of population aging, which is the difference between the 
measure observed in 1980 and that observed under the FVMV projection 
scenario. 
Table V shows the results of this decomposition in terms of the percentage 
contribution of each of the components of population change to the projected 
total changes in the measures of population aging from 1980 to 2050 (medium 
assumption). The data in column 1 show the total projected change over the 70 
year time frame. The figure of 17.87 in column 1 for the population aged 55+ 
means that from 1980 to 2050 the population in this range is projected to 
increase by 17.87 percent over what was observed in 1980. Of that increase, 
24.8 percent and 10.4 percent is attributable to prospective changes in fertility 
and mortality, respectively; 65.9 percent will be attributable to the fertility and 
mortality schedules present in 1980; while the age structure present in 1980 
(which is a function of past trends in fertility and mortality) would actually have 
a negative effect on the projected change of 1.1 percent. 
These data suggest that at least with respect to the percentage of the popula- 
tion at various ages over the age of 55, the contribution of prospective changes 
in mortality becomes increasingly important as older age groups are considered. 
For example, for the 55+ population 10.4 percent of the projected change in this 
measure from 1980 to 2050 will be attributable to mortality change while 28.7 
percent of the projected change will be aUributable to mortality for the 80+ 
population. Prospective changes in fertility will contribute on average about one 
fourth of the change in these measures. The effects of the initial age structure 
and fertility and mortality rates at time zero are at least 50 percent for each of 
these measures. Therefore more than half of the prospective changes in these 
measures of population aging are inevitable and not subject to change by 
altering either fertility or mortality patterns. 
In summary, prospective changes in the aging of the elderly population will 
be largely influenced by the present age structure of China (or past levels of 
fertility and mortality), and vital rates that China has already achieved. Future 
changes in mortality will contribute from 26.7 percent to 34.5 percent of the 
aging of the elderly population itself, while changes in fertility will not con- 
tribute at all because the population that will be in these age groups between 
now and the year 2050 have already been born. All of the other measures of 
population aging listed in Table V will be influenced more by past and present 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Based on the projections presented here, the process of population aging in 
China will accelerate into the 21st century. Aging will occur primarily as a result 
of past trends in fertility and mortality and current vital rates, both of which 
have created a momentum for population aging that cannot be reversed. Recent 
trends toward declining fertility and mortality will further fuel the process of 
population aging. The relative proportions of the total population that are elderly 
will increase, the absolute size of the elderly population will grow rapidly, and 
the elderly population itself will age. The magnitude of the increase in the size 
of the elderly population is probably the most dramatic consequence of this 
aging phenomenon, and it may be put in perspective by noting that there will be 
more people over the age of 65 in China in the year 2050 than there are people 
of all ages in the United States today. 
Current family planning policies in China are designed to reduce birth rates 
and the overall rate of population growth. If this policy is successful in reducing 
fertility rates much below replacement levels and sustaining them even for a 
short time period, the base of the age structure will narrow, bringing even more 
rapid acceleration of population aging. A relaxation of the one-child policy at 
selected time periods during the next 70 years could smooth the birth peaks that 
are expected from the echo effects of previous baby booms, and it would 
decelerate population aging by reducing imbalances in the age composition that 
are anticipated in the future. 
Mortality declines that have occurred in China in recent decades have 
occurred at all ages, but have tended to favor the young over the old. They 
occurred at an extremely rapid pace and brought forth prospects for survival in 
China that rival that of most developed nations (Banister and Preston 1981). 
While these mortality declines tended to decelerate population aging between 
1953 and 1964 by allowing larger proportions of younger birth cohorts to 
survive past the first year of life, past mortality declines which benefitted 
younger age groups will subsequently add to population aging in the future by 
increasing the size of cohorts that will survive to older ages. This will tend to 
accelerate the rate at which the population ages as measured by the size and 
growth rate of the elderly population and the aging of the elderly population 
itself. 
In this study it is assumed that male life expectancy at birth will increase from 
1980 to the year 2050 by anywhere from 4.0 to 9.9 years, and female life 
expectancy at birth is projected to increase from 5.5 to 11.1 years. Since these 
projected levels of life expectancy for China for the year 2050 are comparable to 
that of the United States today, this places China approximately 70 years behind 
the U.S. with respect to mortality. Given that 1) recent mortality declines in 
China have propelled life expectancy within an extremely short time period to 
levels that are comparable with developed countries, 2) the Chinese population 
already maintain lifestyles that are favorable toward longevity in terms of diet 
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and exercise, and 3) there appears to be a tremendous potential for further 
reductions in mortality throughout the age structure even with minor advances in 
medical technology or the distribution of health care to rural areas, it is quite 
possible that the low mortality assumptions used here and in other studies may 
be underestimating China's potential for longevity. If mortality declines are 
underestimated for China, the size and proportional distribution of the elderly, 
particularly the oldest-old, will be considerably higher than current estimates 
indicate. For example, if life expectancy at birth were to increase to 85 for 
females and 80.5 for males by the year 2050 in China, the projected size of the 
65 and older population would be 339.6 million people - or 48.4 million more 
people in this age group than is currently projected in this study under the low 
mortality assumption. This difference of 48.4 million people in the 65 and older 
age group occurs with only a .07 per year difference in the projected life 
expectancy at birth. Additionally, under these more favorable mortality condi- 
tions the number of people projected to be age 80 and over in China in the year 
2050 would exceed 95 million persons. 
Based on the data presented here and in other studies, it is apparent that 
population aging will progress in China at a pace that is unmatched in the rest of 
the world. While scientists throughout the world have been watching the 
development of policy associated with population growth and the one-child 
family policy in China with great interest, it is likely that issues associated with 
population aging will soon dominate their attention. The success of China's 
strict one-child policy indicates that the Chinese government is quite capable of 
rapidly altering internal demographic conditions. While the data presented here 
indicate that at least 50 percent of the aging process in China during the next 70 
years is inevitable, it is still possible to take measures today to reduce the rate of 
population aging and dampen fluctuations in the age structure while preparing 
for the economic and social conditions which accompany an aging population. 
The question that remains is what kinds of policies will the Chinese adopt to 
address some of these problems. 
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NOTES 
1 Many of the discussions of the scientific and political aspects of Chinese demography 
appear in the popular literature such as newspaper articles or Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service publications. Very few articles have appeared in the refereed 
journals, particularly those discussions of policy associated with China's family planning 
program. While many of these articles which appear in the popular literature tend to 
present the Chinese government's view on these demographic issues, there are many 
instances in which the debates which tend to surface between scientists, appeared in these 
publications. Also, the reports of family planning and optimum population targets set 
forth by political officials in these publications are believed to be accurate because these 
are cleared by government officials before release. Many of the references to Chinese 
authors listed here are based on English translations of these publications, and they are 
available to the reader upon request. 
2 These goals or targets were set forth at different times by members of a Central Work 
Conference in Beijing, by members of the National People's Congress, at several times 
by Vice Premier Chen Muhua, and by Vice Premier Yao Yilin. For more details about 
these targets see references 9-14 in Aird (1986). 
3 These negative sanctions included the withdrawal of benefits that are offered to 
families that have only one child. These benefits varied for different cities and by 
ruralAtrban residence, but generally included a monthly child health care fee, priority for 
entering nurseries and kindergartens, free tuition for the child when they enter elementary 
and secondary schools, preference for housing allotments in urban areas and plot 
distribution in rural areas, and an additional 5 percent above what would ordinarily be 
given in the form of a pension after retirement for parents who have only one child (WHP 
1979a; WHP 1979b). Upon the birth of a second child all benefits would stop and all 
monetary benefits previously received would have to be paid back in installments. 
4 The year 2020 was viewed as critical because the large baby boom cohorts of the 1960s 
would begin to reach the age of 60 in that year. 
s Chinese scientists attempted early on to disassociate population aging from their one- 
child policy by arguing that the former is dependent exclusively on past trends in fertility 
and mortality and the shape of the present age composition. The rationale here is based 
on the assumption that population aging is inevitable because of past mistakes in 
controlling births, and that between now and the year 2020 there is plenty of time to plan 
for any population aging problems that may arise. Others argued that a successful family 
planning program would address both population growth and population aging by 
reducing growth rates today, and by reducing the size of the population that would 
survive to older ages in the future. The disassociation between population aging and the 
one-child policy occurred primarily because declining birth rates are known to cause an 
acceleration of population aging, and the recognition of this fact might have led some to 
waver in their support for the family planning effort. 
6 The importance of the mortality assumption to forecasts of the size of China's elderly 
population has been discussed by Xu (1985). 
7 Banister (1988) projected that life expectancy at birth in China would increase from an 
overall level of 66 in 1982 (which was an average of male and female life expectancy at 
birth) to 81 in the year 2050. Since these forecasts of life expectancy were made for the 
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country as a whole, sex differentials in mortality and life expectancy were not explicitly 
taken into consideration. As a result, the projected life expectancy of males is con- 
siderably higher than what has been projected in this study. In the forecasts presented 
here three separate sets of assumptions were made about life expectancy at birth, by sex 
(see Table A-I). Since our medium-range forecasts of life expectancy at birth for males 
and females in China in the year 2050 were 73.1 and 77.6, respectively, this difference in 
the mortality assumption accounts for all of the 73.1 million person difference in the 
forecasts of the 65 and older population. It is therefore apparent that, at least with regard 
to the projected size of the elderly population in China, the mortality assumption is of 
critical importance. 
8 The United Nations defines a population that has aged as one that has at least 7% of its 
population aged 65 and over. This definition has been used by Chinese scientists to point 
out that China has yet to be defined as "old" by international standards, and as a result 
population aging need not be considered a problem at this time. It should be noted that 
the figure of 7% is an arbitrarily chosen number that has no intrinsic meaning. A country 
with a greater or lesser percentage of its total population aged 65 and older may be 
corisidered an aged or aging population, and what is really more important are the growth 
rates and changes in the absolute size of the elderly population. For instance, while the 
percentage of China's total population that was aged 65 and older increased from 3.56% 
to 4.91% from 1964 to 1982, the absolute size of this age group doubled during this same 
time period. While China had yet to reach the international definition of an aged 
population by 1982, the fact is that the population had aged rapidly during that 18 year 
time period. 
9 The childless elderly population in China are supported by the "five guarantee" system 
which provides state-funded food, clothing, medical care, housing, and burial expenses. 
10 China is considered a closed population so migration is not considered a component 
which may influence population aging for the country as a whole. However, internal 
migration patterns might influence the rate of population aging within certain rural and 
urban areas. 
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APPENDIX 
TABLE A-I 
Fertility and Mortality Projection Assumptions 
for China (1980-2050) 
333 
Low 
Total Male Female 
Fertility Rate Life Expectancy" Life Expectancy a 
Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High 
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
1980-85 2.30 2.36 2.80 66.7 66.7 66.7 68.9 68.9 68.9 
1985-90 1.90 2.11 2.50 68.0 68.0 68.0 70.9 70.9 70.9 
1990-95 1.65 1.91 2.20 69.0 69.0 69.0 72.6 72.6 72.6 
1995-00 1.50 1.91 2.10 70.0 70.0 70.0 73.9 73.9 73.9 
2000-05 1.52 1.91 2.10 70.7 70.4 70.1 75.1 74.6 74.0 
2005-10 1.55 1.95 2.10 71.4 70.8 70.1 76.1 75.1 74.1 
2010-15 1.57 1.98 2.10 72.1 71.2 70.2 77.1 75.7 74.3 
2015-20 1.64 2.05 2.10 72.6 71.5 70.3 77.9 76.2 74.4 
2020-25 1.70 2.11 2.11 73.0 71.7 70.4 78.6 76.6 74.5 
2025-30 1.78 2.11 2.11 73.7 72.1 70.4 78.9 76.8 74.6 
2030-35 1.86 2.11 2.11 74.4 72.5 70.5 79.2 77.0 74.7 
2035-40 1.95 2.11 2.11 75.2 72.9 70.6 79.4 77.2 74.9 
2040--45 2.03 2.11 2.11 75.9 73.3 70.6 79.7 77.4 75.0 
2045-50 2.11 2.11 2.11 76.6 73.1 70.7 80.0 77.6 75.1 
The mortality projection assumptions are presented here in summary form as life 
expectancy at birth. The low mortality assumptions (columns 4 and 7) produce the 
highest life expectancy and the high mortality assumptions (columns 6 and 9) produce the 
lowest life expectancy. Coale-Demeny west model life tables were used for projecting 
mortality from life expectancy at birth. 
It should be noted that the model life tables developed originally by'Dr. Coale and Dr. 
Demeny are currently under revision. When completed, the revised west model life tables 
will contain more favourable mortality schedules and survival patterns than is currently 
the case. If the population projections presented here were re-calculated using these new 
model life tables, the size and proportional distribution of China's elderly population 
would be even greater than what is projected here. 
Source: Fertility projection assumptions from 1980-2025 were drawn from United 
Nations estimates (1984). The high and medium fertility series are then projected to 
continue at 2.11 through the end of the projection period. The low fertility series is 
projected to increase linearly from 1.70 at the period 2020-25 to 2.11 by 2045-50. The 
low mortality projection assumptions from 1980-2025 were drawn from estimates made 
by the United Nations (1984) which was their only mortality assumption for China. From 
2025-2050 the low mortality parameters are projected to increase linearly to a life 
expectancy of 80.0 years for females and 76.6 years for males. The high mortality series 
is identical to the low mortality series from 1980-2000, and then life expectancy is 
projected to increase linearly to a life expectancy of 75.1 for females and 70.7 for males 
by the period 2045-50. These values are reached in the low mortality series by the period 
2000-05. The medium mortality projection assumptions are an average of the high and 
low assumptions. 
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